My (in progress) monograph, Habitual Ethics? (Hart Publishing / Bloomsbury) can be read as an endeavour to delineate the conditions under which habits remain plastic enough to be at the service of our ethical life.
In a world in which habits are exploited with more precision than ever before by technological and regulatory interventions, the delineation of these conditions cannot afford to focus only on individual ethical agency, or to rely solely on philosophical insights. While the second part of this book considers what underlies the possibility of moral change -and hence plastic habits- at a collective scale, the first part ties together psychological studies of expertise and skill acquisition with an account of ethical agency and its preconditions.
Material from the book was published as an article in The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (see below).
The emphasis on the non-deliberative underpinnings of ethical agency (and legal normativity) complements the more traditional emphasis on deliberative agency in my previous book, Legal norms and normativity: an essay in genealogy, which was published by Hart Publishing in 2006 (that book won the Peter Birks second prize for outstanding legal scholarship 2008).